Northwest Forest Plan Review

Plans & Reports

Application of the Northwest Forest Plan
in National Forests in California

Prepared for the USDA Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region, by Jack Ward Thomas, Boone and Crockett Professor of Conservation, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, July 25, 2003

INTRODUCTION

Upon the request of Jack Blackwell, Regional Forester, Pacific Southwest Region, USDA Forest Service, I participated in a five-day review of the application of the Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP) (USDA and USDI 1994b) in the national forests in northern California. My observations and comments are based on the handouts given to me at that meeting and the notes that I made during the course of the review. My comments are limited to the circumstances relative to the NWFP in northern California. Any extension of these remarks to apply to other areas (i.e., Oregon and Washington) is inappropriate. These comments are strictly my impressions and should in no fashion be attributed to the USDA Forest Service. As this report is replete with a mass of acronyms, Appendix 1 contains a list of those acronyms and the corresponding descriptions.

My service on a series of committees – most in a leadership role - that developed assessments and possible courses of action to deal with the management of the public lands in the Pacific Northwest relative to the listing of the northern spotted owl (NSO), the marbled murrelet, and various anadromous fishes that led up to NWFP afforded me experience relative to this review. These assignments included the Interagency Scientific Committee to Address the Management of the Northern Spotted owl (ISC) (Thomas et al., 1990), the so-called “Gang-of-Four” (Johnson et al., 1991), the Scientific Assessment Team (Thomas et al 1993), and the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT) (1993). I was also Chief of the USDA Forest Service (FS) from December of 1993 through December of 1996 during the first 2.5 years of application of the NWFP.

The Opening Questions

I set out with one overarching question in mind. Are we doing a better job of managing the people’s forests under applicable law(s) as a result of the NWFP? Then, I formulated three contextual subsidiary questions for which I sought answers. These questions were as follows.

Is the NWFP being implemented as written and approved? If the answer to that question is “no,” will the purposes of the NWFP be achieved given the current and foreseeable forest management operations? And, last, if the current state of affairs continues, will we, in 20 to 30 years, likely be pleased with the results, ecological, economic, social, and political? Answers to those questions, though they emerged somewhat piecemeal during the review (and are reported that way herein), build a rather compelling case. Those answers, and that case, will emerge as the reader progresses through the report.

As part of my assigned responsibilities related to the review, I prepared two discussion papers for the participants. These papers were made available to the attendees and are attached as Appendices 2 and 3 to this report.

Land Allocations under the Northwest Forest Plan

The NWFP includes four primary land allocations. It is important to understand these allocations and their purposes in order to follow the rest of the report.

Late-successional reserves (LSRs) were designated to contain significant amounts of the “best” late-successional forests (LSFs). The management of the LSRs is to emphasize retention of the extant LSFs and use silvicultural approaches to treat younger forest stands to speed development of structural conditions resembling that of LSFs at the soonest possible time.

Riparian reserves (RRs) were designated along stream courses in Matrix lands to enhance conditions for producing and maintaining habitat conditions for anadromous fish. The original widths of the RRs were based on the “precautionary principle” and adjustments in width of the RRs were anticipated following watershed analyses. Management of the RRs was then anticipated to achieve management objectives.

Matrix lands were those lands lying between the LSRs. These lands were to be managed for multiple-use including timber production. LSFs in the matrix were considered open to harvest following application of Survey and Manage protocols (S&M) and appropriate adjustments to deal with those findings. Whatever harvest of mature timber that was expected under the NWFP was expected to come from this allocation.

Adaptive Management Areas (AMAs) were designated to allow innovative approaches to achieving NWFP objectives relatively unconstrained by Standards and Guidelines (S&Gs) and other restrictions applicable to other land designations.

Northern California is Something of a Special Case in the NWFP

The FEMAT report and the NWFP recognized that many of the national forests and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) districts in northern California were drier and hotter than most of the public lands included in the NWFP. As a result, it was anticipated that management would be necessary (largely through thinning in LSRs, matrix lands between LSRs, and in RRs and coupled with regeneration harvests in the matrix lands) to reduce danger of catastrophic (stand replacement) fires. Fire exclusion efforts over more than 90 years (quite successfully for the last 50 years or so) have resulted in accumulation of fuels, increasingly crowded stand conditions, and enhanced probabilities of stand replacement fires – all of which are outside the range of historic occurrence.

These differences are so pronounced that the Interagency Scientific Committee (ISC), in 1990, spent the better part of one week, in a crowded schedule, examining the different circumstances that typified the northern California and far southern national forests in Oregon from the more northern reaches of the range of the NSO in Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia. These differences ranged from the anomaly of prime habitat for NSOs occurring on very high site private lands that had been subject to heavy timber harvest in the early 20th century (with pockets of “old growth” left where harvest was difficult and probably fiscally irrational) to NSO occurrence in the hotter, drier sites (with relatively shorter fire return intervals) on national forests that were further inland. There was even speculation that the NSOs occurrence in these drier sites was, to some unknown degree, an artifact of successful fire prevention beginning in the early 1900s – and with significant success post 1950.

Given the drought that has ensued over the past several years and stand-replacing fires that have occurred in these areas, it would seem both prudent and likely that managers are now even more cognizant of these differences. These areas in northern California are the transition zone between the ranges of the NSO and the California spotted owl. It is well to note that scientists, including some that were involved intimately in the ISC effort, took a different approach to maintenance of habitat than that taken in the NWFP. That, however, is a question for another day.

Actions Leading Up to the Northwest Forest Plan

A long series of complex interwoven events (detailed in Appendix 2) led to the NWFP. The penultimate report preceding the NWFP was that of the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT.) The FEMAT (1993) produced 10 options for a management approach, with no identification of a preferred alternative. President Clinton chose Option 9 as the best compromise between environmental concerns and a sustainable supply of timber from the federal lands in question.

The FEMAT was instructed to assume that all efforts that would be made to protect the NSO would occur only on public lands. The importance of this fact will emerge later.

In the course of preparing the required Record of Decision (ROD) (USDA USDI 1994b), the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (USDA and USDI 1994a), and associated Standards and Guidelines (S&Gs) (USDA and USDI 1994c), Option 9 was significantly altered to afford substantially more environmental protection. Consequently, the NWFP projected a reduction in the probable sale quantity (PSQ) from 1.2 billion board feet per year (bbf/yr) to 1.1 bbf/yr (a reduction of some 8 per cent). In reality, this process altered Option 9 to more closely resemble Option 1 produced by the FEMAT, the most environmentally sensitive of the 10 options presented. There is no record of which I am aware that indicates that efforts were made to “cost out” the changes and additions to Option 9, such as survey and manage (S&M) (USDA and USDI 1994c) and an open-ended requirement for “Watershed Assessment.” The time and costs involved proved to be highly significant and the probable sale quantity was significantly less, as the NWFP was not applied as anticipated.

It seems appropriate to note that President Clinton called the NWFP a “Forest Plan for a Sustainable Economy and a Sustainable Environment” (USDA and USDI 1994c).

Requirements for “Survey and Manage”

Timber sales in the matrix that involve regeneration harvest (usually the removal of relatively mature and relatively large trees) which are the timber sales that would satisfy the timber harvest predictions in the NWFP are commonly referred to as “Green Tree Retention (GTR) Sales.” GTR sales are so called because of the requirements for retention of green trees in the timber sale prescription. S&M surveys are required in such cases. These sales can be anticipated, based on experience, to draw intense scrutiny and likely to be appealed. If these appeals are not successful, legal actions are probable.

It is likely that the S&M requirements were added to the NWFP to enhance the probability of the plan satisfying Judge William Dwyer’s concerns related to welfare of species associated with LSFs and, therefore, considered “sensitive.” Judge Dwyer pointedly asked, in issuing his injunction against any further cutting in LSFs on public lands within the range of the NSO, about the consequences to the other 34 species mentioned by the ISC as likely associated with such habitats. The SAT expanded that assessment to 700 or more species (Thomas and Raphael and others 1993).

This was carried through the FEMAT exercise with additional species identified as likely associated with LSFs and “at risk” because so little was known about the species, not because the FEMAT believed there was any reliable reason to believe them to be either primarily associated with LSFs or in threat of extinction. The number of species of concern increased significantly from the SAT exercise to the FEMAT effort. S&M was added to the NWFP by a succeeding team to the FEMAT (USDA and USDI 1994c) and included an array of such species that had to be surveyed prior to management activities involving ground disturbance.

This seems, upon reflection, a bit of what has turned out to be quite expensive “overkill” in terms of the surveys, delays, and altered management actions, and because it essentially treats all species (including invertebrates and non-vascular plants) identified as being “at risk” to deserve protection until proven otherwise. This turns the concept of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) wherein species are declared as “threatened” or “endangered” upon the evaluation of evidence that a species in question qualifies for that distinction “inside out.”

Why would this new concept of application of the precautionary principle apply only in the Pacific Northwest? Why not elsewhere? Interesting enough, a version of this approach has been suggested by plaintiffs in an ongoing dispute over management of “old-growth” stands in northern Montana national forest in 2003. The application of the S&M requirements seems to lack a “common sense” filter. Why would a number of these species, for example, be in danger from prescribed, low-intensity, burns in fire-influenced ecosystems? These species must have evolved with fires over the past thousands of years.

Seemingly, S&M has been applied for two distinct purposes. The first is to protect species “at risk” until it can be demonstrated that such risk does not exist or is tolerable. The second is to determine numbers, distribution, and habitat associations of S&M species that are assumed to be at risk until proven otherwise. Looking for such species ahead of management actions is of limited value for the second purpose. After all, things are found where you look for them.

Fortunately, more of the S&M effort is shifting to “strategic surveys” which will, due to random sampling be more likely to reveal information on numbers, distribution, and habitat associations. In theory, such information would allow managers to shift to coarse filter approaches to deal with habitat – one underlying foundation of the NWFP that was intended to make it fiscally rational and legally permissible to execute. Fine filter (species by species) approaches are extremely expensive in time, personnel, and dollars. Fine filter approaches are affordable only when limited to a few select species – unless such costs are of no concern.

Contrasting “Fine Filters” and “Coarse Filters”

In discussing the efficacy of S&M, the question was asked if invertebrates, lichens, and fungi were not equally as important as vertebrates and vascular plants (I assumed, in the ecological sense?) In theory, the answer would be “yes.” However, the “diversity clause” in the regulations issued pursuant to the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) deals with “native and desirable non-native vertebrates” and the Act itself with “plant and animal communities.” The Endangered Species Act (ESA) focuses on species that have been determined to be “threatened” or “endangered” in order to meet the purpose of the ESA “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered or threatened species may be conserved, (and) to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species…” In other words, the focus in regulations and law is upon vertebrate species, species declared to threatened or endangered – and, then, through those species upon ecosystems.

There is no requirement, either in law or regulations, to cover all individual species that might conceivably be at risk. The mandate is for coarse-filter application (ecosystems) with provisions for fine-filter approaches for species considered threatened or endangered (by formal proclamation of the USFWS or NOAA-Fish, or of some special management significance and so identified in Forest Plans. The expansion of fine-filter approaches to individual species (including invertebrates and non-vascular plants) that have not been determined to be either threatened or endangered or of special management interest is, so far as I know, unique to the NWFP. Under the NWFP, some 400 species were included under the S&M program with as much as $31,000,000 per year devoted to the S&M program in the beginning years.

The current annual cost is approximately $16,000,000 per year and considers a reduced number of 304 species. Species can be removed from the S&M list only after review and no sites preserved for protection of those species can be “disturbed” until such a review is complete. Many species have been and are being systematically removed from the list. Conversely, it seems likely that at least some species involved in the S&M program will be petitioned for threatened or endangered status. How many more species can be added to that that list before “overload” is reached in terms of development of recovery plans, description of critical habitat, and overlap of recovery plans? The threatened and endangered species programs administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA-Fish) are already staggering under the load with numerous species considered to be “warranted” to be considered as “threatened” but where action is “precluded” due to the insufficiency of resources to deal with the situation.

It should be remembered that the instructions to the FEMAT were to develop options that did the best job of meeting environmental requirements and producing a sustainable supply of timber and jobs in associated industries.

The Northwest Forest Plan’s “Bells and Whistles”

Responses (the addition of “bells and whistles”) that emerged in the NWFP to perceived problems with the adequacy of FEMAT Option 9 to stand up to judicial review do not seem to have been subjected to any economic assessment of costs and benefits , with survey and manage being the prime example. I find it hard to imagine that any Administration would have signed off on a NWFP that required $33,000,000 per year for S&M. If that figure were known, it would have been clear that most, likely all, land management activities would be destined to be carried out “below costs.” Or, for projects not related to production of goods, at several times the actual cost of doing the project.

There is a lesson to be learned. No “constraint” or program should be mandated without a full cost/benefit assessment. Full attention should be paid to the “Law of Parsimony” wherein only activities or costs essential to completion of the task at hand (which, obviously, includes adherence to law and regulation) should be considered acceptable. Research in the arena of the unknown is, of course, a different matter best left to research scientists.

While $33,000,000 is a small amount of money relative to the value of the land and resources in question, it is a significant amount in terms of the limited amount of money in the budget of a land management agency. While dollars are not “substitutable”, it is well to ask the question of the relative value of expenditures. Or, put another way, would a prudent manager given such resources to spend on the highest priority relative to good resource management spend it in such a fashion?

“Clean Audits” and Related Consequences

For some years, the FS has had difficulty in a attaining a “clean audit” of its financial statements. A clean audit requires demonstration of rigorous adherence to spending dollars precisely as dictated in the “line items” in the budget passed by Congress and signed by the President. In order to attain audit approval, an internalized test was derived to assure appropriate and defensible expenditures. Therein, the “primary purpose” of the management action in question determines the category of appropriated funds that can be appropriately used for the stated purpose.

For example, a thinning project in an LSR has the primary purpose of enhancing habitat for NSOs and other LSF associated species. Therefore, the source of funds is “wildlife dollars.” It does not matter that the operation also produces wood used by local mills and reduces the likelihood of stand-replacement fires.

A similar operation carried out in the matrix to improve growing conditions for remaining trees to ultimately produce a timber crop can only be done with “timber dollars” even though it produces wood for local mills, improves wildlife habitat, and reduces the chances for stand-replacement fire.

That very same operation carried out in the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) zone would be executed primarily to enhance the protection of a fire-threatened community. Therefore, “hazardous fuels reduction dollars” would pay for this operation. Yet, wood would go to local mills and wildlife habitat would be improved in the course of the operation.

This may make good sense to an accountant and, doubtless, to those who choose to closely manage budgets and programs. And, surely, it makes sense to those who distrust the motivations and integrity of FS officials. But, it must be admitted that the results do not achieve the most effective and efficient achievement of overall objectives.

The Wildland Urban Interface

Where treatments are made in WUI areas, it can be expected, over time, to attract wildlife species favored by early seral conditions (including deer and elk and associated predators and scavengers) into close proximity with humans. This will likely be exacerbated by the simple fact that management of the federal forests is producing less early successional conditions – i.e., early succession will be increasingly short supply. There will be increasing attendant wildlife and human problems associated with this inevitable state of affairs.

Other problems that can be anticipated include invasion of exotic plants and the attendant problems with appropriate control – e.g., the use of herbicides in proximity to human settlement is frowned upon by some of those affected. Frequent low-intensity burns (carried out when chances of escape are low with more attendant smoke) will be required to maintain desired conditions with associated problems related to smoke and/or “escape” of the fire. Intensified management and repeated expenditures will be required. It should be obvious to all that we are, in poker player’s words, “in for a dime, in for a dollar” with this approach.

The National Fire Plan (NFP), which calls for aggressive actions to reduce dangers of stand-replacement fires in the WUI and other key areas, has been laid down over the NWFP. Discussions related to the “compatibility” of these two plans seemed to indicate considerable short-term compatibility between the plans. And, circumstances of the moment related to reduction of the danger of stand-replacement fire in those areas, particularly WUIs, indicates that is where attention can be more sensibly directed, i.e., the chances of bringing a project to fruition are relatively high.

Consultation with Regulatory Agencies – The Endangered Species Act

We examined only one example during the review that concerned a fuel reduction/salvage project to relieve a small community from some of the danger associated with the accumulated fuel from a recent wildfire (the “Oregon fire”) on the outskirts of the community. That burn lay primarily in a RR along a stream containing spawning habitat for a threatened anadromous fish species within the range of the NSO thereby requiring consultation with both the USFWS and NOAA-Fish.

The combination of S&M requirements ($58,000 was spent looking for and providing protection for an “at risk” mollusk) and prolonged consultation with NOAA-Fish delayed operations significantly. What earlier assessments indicated could have been a near one-half million dollar return to the treasury (and logs for a struggling mill and ready employment in a high unemployment community) turned out to engender a near 1.3 million dollar bid to remove materials that were of much lower value due to decreased value of the timber to deterioration.

There were five tries at consultation at Level 1 (the lowest level) before the issues, finally, were elevated for a decision. While there were several (and likely good) reasons for the repeated consultations, it now seems obvious that the disputes should have been elevated much earlier in the process. The Level 1 teams were so determined to achieve success and avoid the stigma of elevating the decision(s) that associated delays produced an irrational result.

Over time, consultation has become a more efficient process due to earlier involvement by the USFWS and NOAA-Fish, development of rapport within multi-agency teams, earlier resolution of disagreements, and provision for “elevation” of disagreements to higher level for resolution. Successes have included national forests building on each other’s experience and successes, more programmatic consulting, improved working relationships on Level 1 Teams, and ability to make sensible exceptions to agreed upon processes. Problems arise from turnover of personnel on Level 1 Teams, continued modification in plans resulting from Court decisions, settlement of appeals, last-minute projects with short turn-around times, and with Portland being the center of activity. Preparation of “baselines” for a starting point for assessments has proven helpful in facilitating streamlined consultations as it allows for “programmatic” consultation wherein a number of like projects are bundled and handled in the aggregate.

The situation related to appropriate action is becoming confused by the layering of the NFP and Healthy Forest Initiative (HFI) over the NWFP. That will have to be worked out through trial and error and almost certain adjustments due to involvement by the Federal Courts.

Some training may be appropriate to familiarize land management agency personnel with the missions, laws, and regulations that guide regulatory agencies. In many cases, regulators are compelled to carry out actions and processes that they may not agree with, similar to land management agency personnel. “Walking a mile in the other fellow’s moccasins” might be both informative and constructive in building and sustaining rapport between team members. The same could be true of regulatory agency personnel having an understanding the legislative mandates under with management personnel operate even though it has been clearly established that the environmental laws are trumps.

Agencies Have Different Missions, Cultures, and Mores

Circumstances evolving from agencies’ missions, underlying authorizations, cultures, and court cases have combined to produce an unfortunate and very expensive tension. Regulatory agencies focus most intently on short-term effects of projects and give lesser weight to the longer-term consequences, and understandably so. Short-term impacts are easier to comprehend and evaluate for involved professionals, the public, and judges.

Land management agencies are in the business of producing products that take many decades to grow and maintaining an array of habitats and age classes of trees that produce a sustained yield of both over time. For those agencies a vegetative treatment (including timber harvest) is only one step on a long journey and they tend to think of a sequence of steps that leads to a goal with each step necessary to reach the next.

Watershed Analyses – For Whom and For What?

Clearly, needs for RRs of various widths vary from watershed to watershed and stream to stream depending on a number of factors such as stream density, flow, topography, slope, soils type, condition of the buffers, etc. The FEMAT believed that this could be done within a several month period thereby “freeing up” considerable area in the matrix for multiple-use management. This requirement was carried over into the NWFP.

Watershed analyses seem to have taken on an independent life and assumed a weight and purpose that seems to lack adequate coordination, discipline, and consideration for costs related to benefits. Some watershed assessment teams are “dedicated” teams and some are made up of teams lashed together and working part time for the purpose. One Forest Supervisor told a story of putting together a team with a limited number of questions to answer but with leeway to ask others. That team ended up asking and answering 69 questions and, in the course of their activities, spent far more money and time on the task than the Supervisor anticipated.

Riparian Reserves

The FEMAT assumed that a cursory watershed assessment conducted over a period of several months would lead to significant adjustments in the widths of many, if not most, RRs. The process that has evolved is much more than that in detail, expense, and time requirement.

Though some adjustments in RRs have been made, such adjustments are still far below and far behind the time lines expected in the NWFP and even further removed from the assumptions made by the FEMAT in Option 9 (from which the NWFP was ostensibly derived). A number of reasons were aired as to why such adjustments had not been made at the rate nor to the extent anticipated. The two primary reasons seemed to be: significant differences among watersheds in terms of stream densities and the conditions of streamside vegetation; and, lack of focus and discipline to define and achieve the purposes of the NWFP relative to riparian reserves.

Adaptive Management Areas

Adaptive Management Areas (AMAs) were specifically dedicated for development and testing of new approaches to attaining and maintaining LSF conditions and experimenting with new means of engaging local communities in land management. Northern California national forests contain two AMAs. One of these AMAs (Goose nest AMA) on the Klamath National Forest was discussed in detail during the review. The 150,000 acres in this AMA lie at 4,200 to 8,500 foot elevation and receive 10-40 inches of rainfall. Most of the land is ponderosa pine type in mid-successional condition with few large trees. RRs are few and there are no anadromous fish issues.

Initially, an AMA coordinator carried out extensive outreach and community involvement efforts. These initial efforts were deemed “a success from the public point of view.” Research is involved in testing of various approaches to accelerate mid-succession forests to stand structures resembling LSF conditions. These efforts were limited by a lack of markets for removed materials, mostly thinnings used as biomass. S&Gs were “stretched” to facilitate research efforts. Some 70 mmbf/year is being removed annually from the AMA - which is a significant portion of the cut from the Klamath National Forest.

In 1999, the Goosenest AMA Coordinator’s position was cut due to budget problems. Perhaps due to the subsequent decline in public outreach, or to the fact that nearly all the timber cut from the Klamath National Forest comes from the AMA, appeals are becoming more commonplace. Testing of S&Gs has become less acceptable due to both “internal and external resistance” and reliance on “subjective assessment” is less accepted. There has been a constant degradation of the flexibility that was to a part of AMA activities due to internally created barriers. The mention of “internal resistance” had, at this point in the review, been heard a number of times. I was unable to determine exactly what that repeated comment meant. I would suggest that this be further reviewed.

Local contractors were trained to carry out various management activities related to the AMA’s purpose - that was part of the AMA concept. However, these jobs pay significantly less than what “timber jobs” paid. Partnerships developed into a form similar to Resource Advisory Committees (RACs) that have served well. There has been some “stewardship contracting” to take advantage of “bundling” of smaller contracts. But the bids for these contracts (two in number) were over twice that anticipated by the FS. Projects, then, had to be separated and redesigned to be attractive to smaller individual contractors.

At this point, an environmental group appealed projected activities in the AMA due to inadequate application of S&M requirements. As a result, S&M became the order of the day and proposed treatments in the AMA’s riparian reserves were dropped due to increased costs that made the operation fiscally irresponsible.

In addition, there were increasing problems in designing and executing projects due the “primary purpose” restrictions on what dollars from what line items could be used to design and execute operations. The Ranger asked the Region for money earmarked for the purposes of the AMA. That request was unsuccessful. The end result was that the AMA has slipped back to being managed essentially no differently than the rest of the landscape. This was an additional example of the intent of the NWFP being overcome by events.

The Hayfork AMA was never managed any differently than the rest of the landscape. No change in that circumstance is anticipated.

There were no FS personnel from the Research Division along on the review, which could be significant in and of itself. As a result, I thought there was likely little recognition among those in attendance that funding for FS research has been declining relative to the overall FS budget. Any action requiring more involvement from FS Research would require major adjustments in research budgets and/or assignment of personnel.

Clearly, the AMAs in northern California are not now being managed any differently than lands not so designated. And, there seems to be little or no attention to altering that circumstance. If that is to continue, the NWFP should be adjusted to reflect that fact.

“Functionality” of Late-Successional Reserves

“Functionality” seems to be a measure of the degree to which an LSR is providing habitat for LSF related species, primarily the NSO. Related to the general question of functionality, is the developing consideration of the relative “functionality” between LSRs which was not an overt consideration of the NWFP. In essence, LSRs are examined from several standpoints to assess their functionality. Included are such things as the percentage of the LSR in various attributes of NSO habitat (reproductive, feeding, etc) and the quality of those habitats. And, on how many NSO pairs occupy (through survey or through modeling) the LSR versus the number of pairs that were assumed to occupy the LSR at present and at full “maturity” of the LSR.

Those LSRs that rate low in this assessment have been considered for additional constraints in the surrounding matrix lands (up to 7 miles from the boundaries of the LSR) to compensate for these perceived or real shortcomings until rectification occurs, over time, with development of desired attributes within the LSR. Matrix lands (excluding embedded RRs) occupy a variable (by national forest), but small portion of the landscape encompassed by federal lands, less than 10 per cent in some cases.

Obviously, any further constraints in the matrix lands will further erode opportunities for timber harvest and management. Further, it seems likely that the LSRs that are apt to be judged the “least functional” will be those occupying the driest sites. Many of the involved acres will likely be classified as NFP Category II (moderate) and III (high) for likelihood of catastrophic (stand-replacing) wildfire. These conditions classes are correlated with risk of stand-replacing fires, but not perfectly so. Rather these conditions classes denote fire regimes and deviation from natural conditions.

An Operation in a Late-Successional Reserve

We visited the only silvicultural operation that has taken place in an LSR on the eastside national forests (there have been some such limited operations on the “west-side” national forests) since the inception of the NWFP, the Iron Canyon LSR Treatment. Some 800 acres were thinned, or are scheduled to be thinned, to enhance stand development toward LSF conditions. Some 8 mmbf have been removed to date in the form of saw logs (the majority of the volume) and chips (about 1/3 of the volume). The sale, so far, has produced a small return to the treasury. However, the operation was planned and completed pre-application of S&M requirements. The stand, similar to surrounding stands, was “choked” with trees with heavy fuel loading. This level of overstocking is typical of such stands in this region.

Some 250,000 acres of stands in this province that lie within LSRs are candidates for thinning. Such silvicultural treatments were anticipated under the NWFP. Most of this LSR is in Condition Class III (high danger of stand-replacement fire) and the area had a fire return interval of 10-12 years. The site is identified as “IA” in productivity – i.e., a highly productive site. About a third of the planned 800-acre treatment has been completed. It is considered a “pilot project” and is a “commercial thinning” on relatively flat ground. Three pairs of NSOs reside in Iron Canyon and there are 8 known pairs in the LSR. The area is popular for recreational use.

In the Iron Canyon LSR treatment, some 30-40% of stand stocking was removed or about 50% of the basal area. The treatment left a canopy closure of about 40 per cent. Many “legacy trees,” including black oaks in the over story, were left in place. The prescription was “thin from below” with removal in both intermediate and co-dominant classes.

Remaining over story trees were predicted to demonstrate “release effect” (a surge of growth). The resulting stand structure was deemed “somewhat deficient” in snag numbers though all snags greater that 15” dbh were left that were not considered a threat to safety. Some 75% of the stems removed were less than 10” dbh, 95% were less than 15” dbh, with 1% being greater that 20” dbh. The average dbh of trees left on site was 20” dbh. The few trees of over 20” dbh that were harvested proved to be the difference between “making money” and a below cost sale. The created stand condition is considered dispersal and foraging habitat for NSOs.

Between 1995 and 2003, within LSRs in northern California, some 546,000 acres were identified to be in need of similar treatment. Some 17,236 acres were actually treated, approximately 3% of the acres identified.

This begs a question. Will this scale of treatments is LSRs, if continued at this same rate into the future, achieve the goals of the NWFP relative to anticipated forest conditions over the long term? Very generously stated, the answer is “not likely.”

Personnel that made the sale considered it a success because they believed in the efficacy of the sale, it was feasible and “doable,” a “money-maker,” public support was attained, the sale site was on relatively flat ground, and no sophisticated techniques or equipment was required (hence there was little risk of losing or compacting soil). There were no problems between specialists internal to the FS and the USFWS was “on board all the way.”

Admittedly, this sale was “cherry picked” from beginning to end. Even then, the sale was appealed and the original decision was upheld at the FS Regional Office. There was no subsequent lawsuit. Clearly, the sale would have been far “below cost” if they had had to execute S&M protocols. The obvious lesson is that even such a “cherry picked” sale would have been a large-scale money loser under current operational conditions. This is a clear signal that such operations are less likely to occur in the future.

Activities That Were Expected to Occur on a Routine Basis

A review of documents related to the NWFP (FEMAT 1993, USDA and USDI 1994a, 1994b, and 1994c) make clear what was expected to routinely occur in terms of management activities.

The following activities were anticipated to occur on a routine basis:

1. Harvest of LSF stands in the matrix;
2. Regeneration harvest of stands of larger trees in the matrix;
3. Reduction in widths of RRs in the matrix following simple watershed assessments expected to be complete within 1-3 years;
4. Thinning in the matrix to enhance timber production and reduce probabilities of stand-replacement fires;
5. Salvage in the matrix to capture associated timber volumes;
6. Thinning in LSRs to provide fire protection, provide foraging and dispersal habitat for NSOs, and speed stands along toward LSF conditions;
7. Salvaging of dead or dying timber in the LSRs to capture timber volume and reduce fire danger while preserving adequate snags and dead and down woody material; and,
8. Innovative efforts to meet plan objectives in Adaptive Management Areas.

OBSERVATIONS

The following describes the current state of affairs relative to the expectations expressed in the NWFP:

1. There has been little or no harvesting of LSF in the matrix and none is planned. The limited activities that have taken place have primarily involved selection harvest.
2. Regeneration (GTR) harvest of stands in the matrix has nearly ceased (however, two such sales are in progress on the Six Rivers National Forest) and few additional such sales are anticipated in the short term;
3. There have been far fewer reductions in RRs than anticipated coincidently with watershed assessments growing more detailed and expensive than anticipated;
4. Thinning is ongoing in the matrix but in smaller and fewer individual sales than were anticipated;
5. There has been salvage of dead and dying timber in the matrix but at a lesser rate than prescribed;
6. There are only two thinning operations ongoing in an LSR (and these were laid out and sold prior to institution of S&M requirements) with very few such additional operations anticipated – which are not nearly what was anticipated in the NWFP;
7. There is no ongoing or anticipated salvaging of dead or dying timber in the LSRs;
8. There is innovative research ongoing in one of two extant AMAs, AMA coordinator positions have been eliminated, and anticipated actions mimics what is happening in the matrix.

The following observations help explain the differences between what was expected in the 1994 plan and the current situation.

Clearly, management activities have evolved to be quite different from what was expected from the NWFP. The original NWFP has been “overcome by events” and has evolved under various pressures (including budgets, appeals, lawsuits, judicial decisions, loss of personnel, new information, consultations with regulatory agencies, public opinion, associated politics, new laws, and new information) to produce results of a far different form and amount than originally anticipated.

The NWFP has been affected by embedded conflict between those concerned with maximal protection of the environment and those concerned with the delivery of goods and services they felt were promised in the NWFP. This embedded conflict seems destined to continue with or without adjustments in the NWFP.

Judicial decisions have, in their cumulative effect, dramatically and almost routinely changed the management approach related to execution of the NWFP. Judges have shown increasing lack of deference to agency interpretations and professional judgments.

Emphasis has shifted from maintaining timber production in line with desired levels of environmental protection to small-scale salvage sales and thinning operations with relatively minimal environmental impact. The NWFP has not been revised to reflect that situation.

Until all activities related to forest management are executed on a routine basis or the NWFP is altered to reflect those changes, false expectations are maintained.

The NWFP made two promises – enhanced environmental protection and a sustained (though much reduced) flow of goods and services. The first promise has been kept – in the short term and “in spades.” Performance on the second promise has lagged in a number of aspects and has the potential of producing longer-term negative consequences to the environment.

This has produced two obvious consequences in addition to environmental protection – disillusionment among individuals and communities that took the forecasts in the NWFP at face value and little progress on reductions of risk of stand-replacement (perhaps “community-replacement”) fires. I.e., habitat enhancement and perpetuation has not been forthcoming.

FS units are faced with eroding capability of carrying out on-the-ground actions as more experienced personnel retire or move up in the organizational hierarchy. The more newly hired personnel have never seen significant management actions instituted and carried through to completion.

If cutting and processing wood products is of concern, the effect of the loss of “institutional capability” is compounded by the loss of private sector infrastructure to process wood products. That has ramifications for private lands as well.

Native Americans who participated in the review pointed out, on several occasions, that they had considerable knowledge related to the use of fire for habitat manipulation resulting from centuries of experience. They were politely disappointed that their offers to share that knowledge had not been accepted – or even explored. Serious consultation upon such matters could produce significant results from both the standpoint of new or expanded knowledge and in terms of improved relations with a key constituency.

We heard from several Native American women that they had repeatedly requested land management agency personnel to conduct small controlled burns in select areas to enhance the growth of plants that they use in basket weaving and other traditional activities. Evidently the rules, regulations, and procedures that must be adhered to in order to achieve those desired actions have simply precluded actions when weighed against other priorities. Perhaps a waiver could be sought to cover such activities. Native Americans have conducted management burns in these same areas for centuries. Such activities would seem to have low associated risks, and would cover a miniscule portion of the landscape. Or, perhaps, one “programmatic” consultation and EIS could cover all such activities for some prolonged period.

The plethora of “stand alone” environmental laws that were passed in the 1970s fit together poorly with unanticipated interactive and negative effects. Rules and regulations promulgated by various involved agencies to achieve the intent of laws have exacerbated the already poor fit.

The recent decisions that placed all “roadless areas” into what could be considered reserve status has reduced the matrix lands open to management on several Ranger Districts.

With so little management activity ongoing, it seems rational to conclude that what has happened to date, or is forecast to occur in the short term, could have had little, if any, significant overall effect on any species in the short run. The areas that have been impacted by management action are miniscule compared to acres that have burned, many in stand-replacing fires, over the past several years.

The managers of the federal lands in northern California covered by the NWFP are handicapped relative to those managers in Oregon and Washington when it comes to dealing with the NSO. Most of the most excellent research personnel dealing with NSOs and other LSF issues limit their work to Oregon and Washington.

The number of pairs of NSOs in the LSR network in northern California is unknown. Across its range, the NSO seems to be declining at a rate of 3.7% per year. On the Willow Creek Study Area (the only intensive study area in northern California), lambda (a measure of recruitment wherein any number above 1 indicates growth and below l indicates decline) has been above 1 in 4 years and below 1 in 7 years.

Barred owls, which compete with the NSO (and sometimes interbreed with NSOs) is seemingly well adapted to fragmented habitats and is increasing in numbers at a rate of 5-6% per year in the Klamath Province and southern Oregon.

Lethal control of barred owls might provide a useful tool in the preservation of the NSO but such would, likely, not be acceptable. Based on present knowledge, this does not appear to be a problem that can be addressed through habitat management.

Consultations between land management and regulatory agencies are particularly “tricky” where the scope of consideration exceeds the “footprint” of the NWFP. The NWFP is an ecosystem (regional level) plan and is predicated on changing landscape conditions over the long term. Operations on private lands are only marginally part of that “bioregional approach” and are more rationally judged on a landowner-by-landowner and action-by-action basis. Given the levels of protection afforded LSF related species in the NWFP, does it make any sense to continue to deal with site-specific consultations? Clearly, the ESA emphasized the welfare of “ecosystems upon which threatened or endangered species depend” but did not conceive of a management prescription at the scale of the NWFP.

What may be good for the NSO may be judged to have immediate short-term negative impact on a stream containing a threatened anadromous fish but have longer-term positive effects due to protection from stand-replacement fire and other factors. How to deal with short-term negative impacts with a much longer-term positive benefit seems to be an eternal problem.

Trying to match the NWFP and the requirements of processes developed pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is a juggling act. The FS and BLM assessments required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) must be made to mesh with the regulatory agencies’ ESA consultation processes related to impacts on threatened species.

In northern California consultation with both the USFWS and NOAA-Fish is oftentimes required on the same project related to “threatened” species. The FS and BLM must deal with S&M species in addition, and at the same time, vastly magnifying the assessments that must be accomplished prior to project initiation. One slip up or omission in procedure can derail a project with its associated sunk costs. There is nowhere else where process requirements are so high, so expensive, and so vulnerable to appeals and litigations. The NWFP has come to personify “analysis paralysis.”

Analysts are reported to be “nervous” about the adequacy of “connectivity among LSRs.” There is little information, even after 10 years, as to what is in the RRs. In the absence of such information, there is considerable “internal and external resistance” to reduction of RRs.

The FEMAT concluded that stream buffers (even after reduction), combined with whatever forest cover existed in managed stands between the RRs, would provide more than adequate capability, over time, for exchange of species between habitats at rates precluding genetic isolation. This replaced the earlier restrictions in the Interagency Scientific Committee (ISC) strategy for use of the “50-11-40 Rule” (50 % or more of the area in trees 11” dbh or more with 40% or more canopy cover). Considering that less than 10% of many areas covered by the NWFP are not in a reserve of some sort (or, put another way, over 50% of the land base that is not otherwise in a “reserve” status lies within a RR) it seems appropriate to ask if there is any real reason to be concerned about isolation over decades and centuries?

Line officers (from the Regional Forester on down the chain of command) seem to be, in at least some situations, deferring management responsibilities and prerogatives to technical staff. Technical staff should assess, propose, and provide advice. Line officers should assess and dispose.

Technical staffs do not seem subject to review of their performances in a manner that would assure that performance meets expected standards and consistency of application in regard to interpretation of the NWFP.

The lag in regeneration harvests in both LSFs and execution of GTR regeneration harvests in older stands that are surrounded by overstocked mid-successional stands is producing a worsening circumstance related to the lessening amount and most effective distribution of stands in early successional conditions. LSFs and early-successional forest stands are the most productive of biodiversity with mid-successional stands being the least productive in that regard.

Attention to juxtaposition of stands of various ages and structures is critical if managers are to capture “edge effects” advantageous to some species or, alternatively, dampen such effects for species adversely influenced depending on the species of interest.

The federal lands, particularly those managed by the FS, are increasingly dominated by forest in mid-succession or older stands. What early succession that is occurring is resulting primarily from stochastic events – primarily stand-replacement fires. Early successional species include deer and elk and other hunted species. Problems are apt to result as recreational hunting opportunities decline and, simultaneously shift, to private lands, where access may be restricted, and state lands where crowding seems likely. This is not a minor social/economic concern.

Emphasis is now on thinning, which seems likely to continue under both the NWFP and the NFP. At some point, it appears both rational and forthright to adjust the PSQ associated with the “modified by events” NWFP to reflect that reality.

Evidently, less than 5-10 percent of the timber volumes being proposed for cutting are anticipated to come from GTR activities. This is a dramatic departure from assumptions in the NWFP, which were said to have occurred for two primary reasons: 1.) Projections made in the NWFP have proven “unrealistic” (i.e., on the ground situations do not match the modeling) and 2.) GTR sales require S&M on every acre and, because larger trees are proposed for cutting, appeals are certain and suits are likely.

GTR sales have moved to the “back burner” or “off the table.” A GTR sale requires an EIS because such sales have a probability of at least a short-term “adverse effect” on a threatened or sensitive species. Scoping quickly reveals that a GTR sale will be difficult and, perhaps, prohibitively expensive due to S&M and an EIS (with up to a “50-65 page assessment on each sensitive species”).

A GTR sale of any significance in either timber volume or acreage involved is simply assumed to lead to appeal and, if the appeal fails, challenge in Court. After the decisions made by Judge Rothstein, signals were said to have come from the USFWS and NOAA-Fish that said, in effect, “don’t send us any GTR sales” if quick and favorable answers are desired.

Line officers desire to avoid appeals because appeals that are “settled” (and, certainly, legal actions entailing a loss) result in the “bar” to be cleared related to process and assessment going up a notch – or several. A continual “raising of the bar” has been characteristic of the history of the NWFP and seems to be the most likely mechanism through which the NWFP has morphed into its current form.

The overlap of the NWFP, NFP, and FHI can be viewed as compatible in the short term (as all emphasize thinning) and more apt to be conflicting in the longer term (due to failure to meet expectations in the NWFP for GTR operations and LSF harvesting in the matrix). As circumstances have brought all management actions to a short-term view, it is pragmatic, to emphasize short-term compatibility.

Such actions can be interpreted to exhibit short-term compatibility with the NWFP and are more “politically correct” – and, therefore, challenges are less likely. Longer-term compatibility will be lacking as assumptions and projections in the NWFP will not be met fully.

A reduction in the number of budget line items might well result in accomplishing more work on the ground and facilitate a “clean audit” at the same time. But, such would require more trust in the agencies – across the spectrum of interested parties - than presently exists.

It would be in the interest of public safety, and, likely, in keeping with Administration and Congressional intent, to seek exemption from S&M for such activities as thinning and controlled burns in the WUI. Over the next decade or so, such treatments would affect only a tiny fraction of the landscape. And there should, in reality, be very little risk to S&M species, which may be assumed to have evolved with a 5-10 year fire frequency.

Adjustments in the NWFP should commence at the soonest rational time and acknowledge evolved circumstances and utilize new information and experience. Or, conversely, assurance should be forthcoming from the Administration and Congress that the NWFP is valid, supported, and it is expected that the plan will be vigorously carried out. If that is so, actions will need to match words.

Adjustments, if any, should include answers to following questions:

1. Should LSFs in the matrix identified for harvest actually be harvested under the circumstances of the day?
2. If so, should and will S&M protocols be relaxed to allow that to occur? Clearly, any harvesting of those stands under present circumstances related to S&M is unlikely and should have been obvious for some years.
3. If not, it should be clear that it is likely all management activities will be carried out “below cost” relative to goods produced. The operative question at that point is whether the situation resulting from the action is worth the costs of carrying out that action.
4. Are the FS and BLM and the Administration prepared to deal with the protests and civil disobedience that (from past experience) can be expected to be associated with such action as the harvest of late-successional forests? If the answer is “no,” it is one more reason to face reality.
5. If LSF stands in the matrix are excluded from harvest, it is clear that protection for NSOs, and other associated species, will have been significantly enhanced over that anticipated in the NWFP. In such circumstances, should the NWFP be revised to recognize that extra significant protection and consider transfer of land from LSRs into the matrix as a trade-off?
6. The FEMAT was instructed to absorb all impacts of protecting the NSO on federal lands so that private lands would be as free from constraints as possible. Considerable protection for NSOs now exists on private lands – which was unanticipated by the FEMAT. Should that added protection above what was anticipated by the FEMAT be considered in any revision of the NWFP?
7. Thinning of younger overstocked stands in LSRs was expected to routinely occur to enhance the likelihood that these LSRs would have both an increased chance to withstand stand-replacing fire (particularly in fire-influenced zones and WUIs) and more quickly accommodate additional pairs of NSOs over the longer term. Essentially no such actions have taken place and do not seem likely in the near future. Therefore, is more protection necessary elsewhere (i.e., in the matrix or on private lands) to accommodate for enhanced likelihood (relative to expectations in the NWFP) of loss of all or portions of these areas to stand-replacement fire and the much longer time frames anticipated to be required for these stands to reach desired conditions?
8. Delays in, and decreasing likelihood of, reductions in widths of RRs, can be anticipated to significantly decrease the acreages estimated in the NWFP to be in the matrix while simultaneously increasing environmental protection. Should this be considered as providing leeway for additions to or relaxation of constraints in the LSRs or transfers of lands from LSRs to the matrix? Or, should relaxation of constraints on private lands be considered?
9. In some cases, recent actions to provide permanent protection of roadless areas were layered over the NWFP and added to the areas in actual reserve. Should these additions be assessed with an eye to readjustments in LSRs and adding offsetting acreage to the matrix?
10. As GTR timber sales (regeneration sales) in the matrix are dwindling in number and extent (essentially to zero), it might be assumed that these stands of larger trees have, de facto, been added to the reserve system. Is that accurate? If so, should other stands in matrix be quickly subjected to thinning to make up the difference (though the “kind of wood” would be much different from that anticipated in the NWFP)?
11. Numerous other similar questions could be posed. In general, what has occurred over the life of the NWFP has been consistently more conservative as related to environmental protection with resultant significant reductions in the products produced – both in amount and type. Is that socially/economically/ politically acceptable? Should compensatory changes be made to come closer to meeting the original estimates for products in the NWFP?

The S&Gs issued with the NWFP contain far more “bells and whistles” than anticipated by the FEMAT. These S&Gs have been in existence long enough to allow an analysis of effectiveness and feasibility (technically, fiscally, and in costs and benefits.) Such assessments would be in keeping with assumptions made by the FEMAT that “adaptive management” take place routinely.

The FEMAT relied on coarse-filter approaches to dealing with wildlife with fine-filter applications reserved for threatened species and a few other species of special interest. A shift to fine-filter approach for the several hundred non-threatened species now covered by the NWFP was a huge change with dramatically increased associated costs. No land management plan with such a burden of imposed costs can even hope to produce products at a cost that is not doomed to be several, if not many, times the market value of resultant products.

If the Administration and the Congress desire and are willing to fund a research program to obtain the information about species abundance, distribution, habitat association, and viability for all plant and animal species for which adequate information is available to facilitate management is lacking, it should be conducted under the auspices of the research division or a research and development charter. Isolating such efforts to one section of the country and doing the work under the S&M approach in the NWFP is very high cost and highly inefficient to such an endeavor.

If S&M is necessary and prudent in the NWFP (which has more built in protection than any forest management plan anywhere in the world), why is it not applied across all ecosystems in the United States where land management activities are ongoing on federal lands?

Any significant testing of S&Gs and assumption in the NWFP relative to the development and testing of new innovative management approaches are likely dependent on innovation undertaken in the AMAs. Such actions are limited.

The rationale, economic costs, and technical and monetary feasibility of the S&M approach should be independently reviewed and assessed. The Agriculture and Natural Resources Board of the National Academy of Sciences would be a logical source of such a review as associated “politics” of the current situation precludes an effective review and adjustment by involved agencies or “the usual suspects” involved in day-to-day debates relative to the NWFP and its application. While such a review would be expensive, the costs would be in minor fraction of the yearly costs devoted to the S&M program.

Statements related to the amount of board feet of timber offered for sale under the NWFP are misleading in the sense that the “kind of board feet” being offered for sale is quite different from what was anticipated. I.e., essentially no larger trees (save for some salvage sales) are being harvested. This is a dramatic departure from the expectations in the NWFP.

Loss of flexibility related to the drive to attain “clean audits” may well have created inefficiencies, in carrying out what land management operations remain feasible under the NWFP. The land classifications (purposes) in the NWFP may well magnify this problem. Any solution must come from the Administration and the Congress. One such solution is to use fewer but more inclusive budget line items. Another option is to allow more flexibility for some portion of funds to be moved from one category to another at the discretion of line officers of appropriate rank and as approved by the Chief or Regional Foresters.

Managers may perceive that smaller projects have lower costs and fewer risk from appeals or litigation. But, there is a “Catch 22 in such strategies. In reality, smaller projects may lack the economies of scale inherent in larger projects. In a trade-off between capturing economies of scale and associated increased risks of not bringing projects to fruition, managers are increasingly designing smaller projects. This is bad economics but good game playing.

Smaller projects intended to reduce fire risks are less apt to achieve their purpose of preventing or forestalling stand-replacement fires if they are not strategically and appropriately located and sized. However, such projects are more and more located in the places (the WUIs) and are of the sizes (small) that render the highest probability of getting the project accomplished. The “political incorrectness” of challenging a small thinning project in close proximity to a town in danger of being engulfed in a catastrophic fire is an obvious factor that enters the calculus of the best bet for achievement.

Further, such projects have the best chances of success if no larger trees of commercial value are taken. This holds despite indications from research that indicate when thinning in a mixed age stand is limited to “thinning from below” it is not as effective as a more generalized approach in which some larger trees are taken to produce a varied stand structure. In addition, such an approach to thinning also produces some revenue to offset costs.

In addition, it is becoming clear that larger corporations no longer consider the national forests under the NWFP – or any other circumstance – as a reliable source of wood on a sustained basis. That, in turn, has changed the ecological/economic/social/political landscape. The private infrastructure that will handle any wood products from federal lands in northern California is composed of smaller independent mills that, in turn, are largely dependent on wood from federal lands. If the intent is to produce any significant wood supply from the federal lands, the relationship with these mills can be viewed as “symbiotic.”

Many smaller mills have failed over the past 15 years. Those that remain are “barely holding on.” The shift to small diameter logs available from thinning operations inversely affects economic haul distance – i.e., the mills cannot go as far for logs and make a profit. Failure of additional mills will worsen prospects of offering sales of small diameter material that will attract buyers – which is already a problem.

A side-by-side assessment of the FEMAT’s Option 9, the NWFP as adopted, and current reality related to execution of the NWFP might be quite informative in understanding the current problem.

The review included participants from a range of interest groups including Native Americans, county supervisors, environmentalists, timber workers, mill owners, aides to Congressmen, educators, and a wide variety of Forest Service personnel. All of those who spoke (save one representative of an environmental group) expressed frustrations of one kind or another with the current state of affairs related to management under the NWFP.

Line officers are directing their attention to thinning and salvage operations with increasing focus on the WUI. However, S&M requirements and consultations with the regulatory agencies are delaying management actions to protect at risk communities.

While Level 1 teams should strive diligently to achieve resolution, it should be made clear by line officers that it is not a “failure” to elevate a decision. Such elevation could help ensure prompt decision, provide guidance on future resolution of similar disputes, and serve as means of quality control.

Watershed analyses have increasingly become an integral part of operations - seemingly without adequate consideration of their intent and purpose. Such efforts seem to have, in some cases, “escaped” management control. The FEMAT originally conceived of watershed analyses as relatively broad-scale assessments to judge the adequacy of protected areas along stream courses that were painted with a broad brush with the precautionary principle in mind and expectation of rapid adjustment – and that was 10 years ago.

Consultation teams struggle with “quality versus quantity.” Without adequate discipline, documents seem to get larger as more information is included to preclude appeals and successful legal actions. This may be the “Mark Twain Principle” in action – “Please forgive this very long letter. I did not have time to write a short one.” Overly long documents are relatively weak documents containing “chinks” that can be exploited in appeals and legal actions. Many failures to execute operations derive from faulty adherence to the details of prescribed process and not from problems with the action in question.

The S&Gs for watershed assessments calls for the provisions of “recommendations.” Such recommendations are, in today’s litigious climate, tantamount to a decision. Such “recommendations,” are fodder for appeals and litigation. Decisions should rest with those charged to make such decisions and should not be made inadvertently or prematurely through “recommendations.”

Where public lands occur in a checkerboard pattern with private lands, previous and ongoing management actions on the private lands - whose managers are not constrained by the requirements of the NWFP - may produce a situation whereby assessment will reveal a “cumulative effect” in the watershed which will constrain active management on public lands. Any “blocking up” of lands in “checkerboards” should have long-lasting benefits to all landowners.

If timber production remains of any real concern as an output of the NWFP, it is well to remember that some (perhaps most) RRs encompass relatively high site land for growing trees and ease of access. Every such high site acre that is released to the matrix is significant in meeting objectives for wood production.

The thrust of the regulatory agencies’ activities is based on the precautionary principle (“first, do no harm”). Land management agencies focus on the welfare of base resources with coincidental achievement of the multiple-use objectives set out for the agency – in a sustainable fashion. Reconciliation of these differences is essential if the regulatory and management agencies are to work successfully together to achieve the purposes of the laws that govern their actions and provide their mandates.

Many LSRs on drier sites with frequent fire return intervals may have come into conditions suitable for NSOs due to a century of fire protection. Oddly, but realistically, maintaining such condition depends, long term, on reductions in likelihood of stand-replacement fires of wide extent.

The one ongoing operation in an LSR that was examined barely broke even in fiscal terms – and it was cleared before S&M requirements came on line for such activities. It is clear that addition of S&M requirements will probably make any such operation in LSRs “below costs” operations - i.e., such will make no economic sense in terms of materials removed. The test will be whether or not the activity was worth the cost in terms of wildlife management.

The consensus seemed to be that the FS Research Station, using a “Research and Development” model along with “earmarked” funding, should much more heavily involved with the planning and management of AMAs. For, no matter how innovative or successful alternative management approaches prove to be, it will be difficult to “sell the story” without appropriate design and monitoring of results. Or, alternatively, the AMA designation should be removed.

CONCLUSIONS

So, in the end, I return to the questions with which I started the review.

Is the NWFP being applied in northern California as it was written and approved? The answer is “no.”

Will the purposes of the NWFP be achieved given a continuation of the current state of affairs? The answer is “yes” only for the short-term, in that threatened species and the LSF ecosystem are receiving essentially maximal protection. In the long-term, the answer is likely to be “no” due to a combination of factors. First, delays in recruitment of stand structures resembling LSFs at a rate required for replacement of existing LSFs (which will be constantly eroded due to losses to natural events of fire, blow down, and insects and disease). Second, failures to maintain schedules for thinning of younger, increasingly-dense stands in matrix, RRs, and LSRs to enhance probabilities of avoiding the worst consequences of stand-replacing fires will add to the probability of diminishing amounts of LSF over time. The combination of these two realities delivers the answer to the question.

And, most certainly, the de facto application of the NWFP has failed to meet the promises made to people and communities that were dependent on a sustainable supply of wood from associated public lands.

Somehow, we continue to debate the issues related to the management of the lands managed and cared for by the FS and the BLM as if they were technical questions that can be solved by rigid adherence to the NWFP, the S&Gs, the EISs, the RODs, budget line items, new direction (NFP and FHI for example), and so forth. The agencies’ dedicated personnel struggle, politicians speak out (one way or the other), budgets twist and turn, elections come and go, the “conflict industry” does their thing, the Courts bring down decisions from on high, the agencies’ adjust and try again, and the people in rural communities wonder what hit them and question if anybody cares.

I have worked often in India with colleagues who struggle, against all odds, to maintain forests and wildlife under conditions that most of us cannot imagine. And, to my continuing wonderment, they are, by and large, successful. A bit of advice that was given to me then echoes in the back of my mind as I come to the end of this report. “Remember Sahib, when elephants fight only the grass suffers.”

LITERATURE CITED

Thomas, J. W., E. D. Forsman, J. B. Lint, E. C. Meslow, B. R. Noon, and J. Verner. 1990. A conservation strategy for the northern spotted owl: a report of the Interagency Scientific Committee to Address the Conservation of the Northern Spotted Owl. USDA Forest Service and USDI Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service. Portland, Oregon.

Thomas, J. W., M. G. Raphael, R. G. Anthony, E. D. Forsman, A. G. Gunderson, R. S. Holthausen, B. G. Marcot, G. H. Reeves, J. R. Sedell, and D. M. Solis. 1993. Viability assessments and management considerations for species associated with late-successional and old-growth forests of the Pacific Northwest. USDA Forest Service, Portland, Oregon.

Johnson, K. N., J. F. Franklin, J. W. Thomas, and J. Gordon. 1991. Alternatives for management of late-successional forests of the Pacific Northwest. A report to the Agriculture Committee and Merchant Marine Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives. Washington, D. C.

Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team. 1993. Forest ecosystem management: an ecological, economic, and social assessment – report of the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team. USDA, USDI, U.S. Department of Commerce, and Environmental Protection Agency. Portland, Oregon.

USDA and USDI. 1994a. Final supplemental environmental impact statement on management of habitat for late-successional and old-growth forest related species within the range of the northern spotted owl (Northwest Forest Plan). Portland, Oregon.

USDA and USDI 1994b. Record of decision on management of the habitat for late-successional and old-growth forest related species within the range of the northern spotted owl (Northwest Forest Plan). Portland, Oregon.

USDA and USDI. 1994c. Standards and guidelines for management of habitat for late-successional and old-growth forest related species with the range of the northern spotted owl. USDA and USDI. Portland, Oregon.

USDA and USDI. 2003a. Draft supplemental environmental impact statement. To remove or modify the survey and manage mitigation measure standards and guidelines. USDA and USDI, Portland, Oregon.

USDA and USDI. 2003b. Draft supplemental environmental impact statement. Clarification of the language in the 1994 record of decision for the Northwest Forest Plan: national forests and Bureau of Land management districts with the range of the northern spotted owl. USDA and USDI. Portland, Oregon.

APPENDIX 1

Acronymns

AMA – Adaptive Management Area.
bbf – billion board feet
BLM – Department of Interior – Bureau of Land Management
dbh – diameter breast high
ESA – Endangered Species Act
EIS – Environmental Impact Statement
FEMAT – Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team
FS – The United States Department of Agriculture – Forest Service
GTR – Green Tree Retention
HFI – Healthy Forest Initiative
ISC – Interagency Scientific Committee to Address Management of the Northern Spotted Owl
LSF – Late-Successional Forest
LSR – Late-Successional Reserve
mmbf - million board feet
NFMA – National Forest Management Act
NSO – Northern Spotted Owl
NOAA-Fish – The National Marine Fisheries Service of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency
NWFP – Northwest Forest Plan
PSQ – Probable sale quantity
RR – Riparian reserves
RAC – Resource Advisory Committee
ROD – Record of Decision
SAT – Scientific Assessment Team
S&M – Survey and Management
S&G – Standards and Guidelines
USDA – United States Department of Agriculture
USDI – United States Department of Interior
USFWS – United States Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of Interior
WUI – Wildland Urban Interface

APPENDIX 2

Sustainability of the Northwest Forest Plan –
Dynamic vs. Static Management

Prepared for the USDA Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region, by Jack Ward Thomas, Boone and Crockett Professor of Conservation, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, June 23, 2003

See www.fs.fed.us/r5/nwfp for text of Appendix 2.

APPENDIX 3

Appropriate Roles of Line Officers and Technical Staff

Prepared for the USDA Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region, by Jack Ward Thomas, Boone and Crockett Professor of Conservation, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, June 26, 2003

See www.fs.fed.us/r5/nwfp for text of Appendix 3.

USDA Forest Service - Northwest Forest Plan Review
Last Modified: Tuesday, 05 August 2003 at 11:56:06 EDT