

Telecomm w Mike Alarid

Station Fire –

Mike has been w agency since 1980 – 10 yrs on engines on Inyo – came to Bear Divide IHC in 1989 – became Supt in 1999 – OSC2 (T) ICT3 (Q) and a bunch of others

Bear Divide had come off LaBrea and was on days off – DV1 called and asked Mike to have the crew Report to the Station

Reported to the fire at 27th August at 0600 hrs to the AC station which was serving as the ICP - -

Mike noticed fire was active as he was coming in - chkd in with folks –

Mike sent scout up the road – wasn't a type 4 organization fire – Mike attending the briefing all the players were there – Ram did the briefing – Mike was identified as a DIVS w assistance from LAC

Div A (above the road) – keep the fire within the IA perimeter

Mike had DIV Z (below the road) – he spread the resources out – wanted to keep the fire from crossing Dark Cyn and going to CC Ridge –

Key thing from Ram was FF Safety - -don't over engage – lacking some line leadership as the incident was growing – discussed possibility that the fire had already grown to T2 complexity

Mike was on scene at 0834 and wx 87degrees and 9 % rh – fire behavior was extreme at 0834 and fire was running underneath the road - -there were no aircraft he saw at 0834 – might have been there but he didn't see them

Between 0830 and 0930 the fire came from underneath the road and spotted above the road –

Fire bhvr was too extreme and terrain was too steep – there was just no anchor and no good spots to get to the fire below the road

Mike had aircraft on scene about 0900 to 0930 hrs –

Mike noted at 1040hrs winds changed and the spot fire above the road started to exhibit extreme fire behavior – Div Z TF Leader (LAC) pulled back folks from the fire to get to the road for safety

By 1100 hrs there was extreme fire bhvr both above and below the road

By the afternoon, temps were triple digits and rh single digit and fire behavior was extreme

Mike had very good notes from the events of the day 27 August during the extreme fire behavior – focus was on FF safety and trying to do effective action where they could

Mike was frustrated that we didn't have leadership on the ground – the fire was very complex – Mike was frustrated that they didn't have DIVS's they couldn't get – esp w Morris Fire so close – he was way too busy – he was the only DIVS until the Geronimo IHC Supt showed up and he then became a DIVS

By 1100 27 Aug folks were off the line due to extreme fire behavior

By 1530 enough of the fire had moved on and Mike put some crews in towards the heel to start some work on the fire.

When Mike showed up he was very concerned about how successful he might be – esp when he got over to CC ridge but within the hour the fire had jumped up the ridge again – within the hour by about 0930 it had spotted up above the road – Mike shut down the AC hwy traffic at that time because of the extreme fire bhvr –

When the AC were there they were only trying to do what they could – a/c weren't knocking the fire down --

What was important for the review team to know? - Mike asked - -Why wasn't there more leadership on the ground w the Morris fire right there? Mike said – he thought if there were more local resources on the ground maybe they could have done better - Mike said – more of our ground resources are becoming more analytic given their lack of experience as opposed to knowing specific local fire behavior –

Fire bhvr was extreme from the time he showed up at 0830 – Mike thought this was a tough fire from the beginning – there were many areas where the fire couldn't be accessed, even with helicopter support –

This was very tough ground – couldn't get boots on the ground underneath the road -- very tough weather and very tough fuels conditions –