Forestry Canada and University of Alberta. Jasper Park. March 1992
WHAT WOULD AN ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS ACTUALLY DO
TO INTEGRATE ECOSYSTEM AND SOCIAL SYSTEM HEALTH?
--------
A SPECTRUM OF APPROACHES
by
Dennis P. Bradley
Forest Economist
Forest Service USDA
St. Paul, MN
The ongoing controversy in the Pacific Northwest, pitting the Northern Spotted Owl against communities dependent on public timber harvest, is a clear example of how far we must yet travel to understand how ecosystem and social system health intertwine. This case, as do many others, seems to demand a choice between economic necessity and environmental protection. Yet what we really seek is the over-arching and mutually dependent goal of ecosystem and social system health. But even when the need for this linkage is accepted, ecosystem understanding is at such an early stage in its development that the poor surrogates of Spotted Owls or other endangered species are forced to stand in for all the complexities of ecosystem health. For owl declines only hint at the many ways we misapprehend the crucial effects of our demands on natural resources. Moreover, due to similar shortcomings in our understanding of societal health--in all its aspects--we too often depend on a meager set of economic indicators such as jobs and income. Human expectations for development--which surely go beyond mere survival--require that we understand the dynamics and imperatives of both social systems and ecosystems.
However, understanding how these two areas relate requires two fundamentally different perspectives and tools. To understand Nature--including some aspects of humans and their societies--science is embracing the view that "necessity"-- that which is and cannot change--is defined by a small set of Laws of Impossibility. It now seems all but certain that only a few general characteristics of real things and processes are either impossible or set for all time--creating something out of nothing or traveling faster than light are examples. This implies that over the long term, while Nature's possibilities depend on unique initial conditions and other probablilistic features, the future is indeterminate except in these most general ways. Regarding Nature-- short of human societies--its reproduction and change primarily involve chemistry, biology, and ecology and are largely the effects of physics and genetics. These domains can and do self-organize and operate without the conscious participation of its animate or inanimate components.
But understanding social systems and their integration with the rest of Nature requires, in addition, a different view. While we are also subject physically to the same tiny set of prohibitions as the rest of Nature, consciousness and reason allow us to grasp consequence, and to at least imagine the power to control our own destiny. As a result, while we would therefore seem to be free--as the rest of Nature is not--we are ironically compelled to construct our own "visions" not only of what is possible but what it means; what we "ought" to do. In other words, we are compelled to decide--by ourselves or as inspired--what is morally correct! And since meaning for humans is based in part on physical necessity, as our understanding of Nature and Society grows, so too our meanings and actions may also change. Considering notions of ecosystem and social health, and the implicit or explicit task of defining it ourselves--in the process, defining it for other species as well--is a key responsibility entailed in an Ecological Economic (EE) world view.
The remainder of the paper briefly considers some questions of value that necessarily arise, and what research methods and tools have so far resulted from these value presuppositions. Most of the examples are taken from the publications of the International Society of Ecological Economics.
To go any further, we must first briefly consider values. That is, because we misunderstand: 1) the role of the economy in a larger social system, 2) the requirements of ecosystems themselves, and 3) the interdependence of ecosystem and economic system to meet our needs; new criteria are required to judge the fitness of our actions within a larger reality than merely what we "imagine." We also seek to judge the fitness of ecosystems and their ability to meet our needs as well as to satisfy their own requirements. In short, we must find common "values" to compare these different phenomena.
Ecosystem Health
Taking ecosystems first, as a result of their species, structures and processes which have evolved and adapted over an immense time, ecosystems can surely be considered as having requirements. And if by nothing more than definition, a healthy ecosystem is more likely to meet these requirements and thereby survive. But how do ecosystems and all they contain, organize activity so that their survival and elaboration has continued for eons? Moreover, ecosystems also produce goods and perform certain services that underpin human economic actions. We now know that many of these goods and services may be available to us in no other way--climate, and nutrient cycles are examples. It was the production for an ecosystem's requirements that science until recently has either not understood, or placed in a position subordinate to human needs. We had it largely backwards--while humans need ecosystems, ecosystems do not need humans.
We now know that not all of Nature's "bounty" is available for our taking. Attaining economic health requires that we also consider an ecosystem's requirements. Of course, the "health" of an evolving dynamic systems cannot be settled for all time. At present we are forced to rely on the most general indications of a dynamic stability which also recognizes our unavoidable economic impacts. Spotted Owls are such an indicator--albeit an inadequate one. But our economic needs are only one source--albeit an increasingly important one--for ecosystem changes.
Social System Health
Similarly regarding social systems, while society may depend first on successful economic activity--acquiring and using resources to adapt and survive--social health cannot be reduced to economic health. For in addition to its ecosystem and economic base, a society also consists of its culture, its institutions, and certainly not least, its individuals. These components and their interrelations cannot be reduced to the mechanical analogs of economics because social systems are driven by meaning as much as by costs and physics. But here too, as with a dynamic natural world, current notions of social health--at least at the policy level--are limited to the most general notions of maintaining a dynamic stability. However, there already exists a highly developed body of social theory and practice which should be extremely useful in EE's efforts to broaden the issue of social health beyond mere economics. See especially Lewis (1991).
Integrated Health
Due to the tremendous scale of our economic impacts on ecosystems, and subsequent reverberations upon social systems, it is urgent that we develop more integrated notions of health. In order to direct our own future--to achieve our own ends to the extent possible--we must confront both the largely irreplaceable role of ecosystems in our lives, and the inescapable task of defining our own visions. These visions will not only require the help of science to provide a better understanding of the material world but will also require us to explicitly construct the ethical and aesthetic dimensions with which to judge our actions.
The Nature of Productivity and the Productivity of Nature
When we talk about integrating notions of health, we must consider those aspects that both systems share--in particular both systems have developed various mechanisms to adapt to the environment. For ecosystems, this adaptation over the long term is often manifested in genetic change which in turn, changes the environment itself, engendering further adaptations and so on and on. As a result, the accidental skills and abilities of both individuals, species, and of such processes as weather, persist. In other words, individuals, species, and processes must physically reproduce. But for social systems, reproduction entails something quite different--the reproduction of meanings. This reproduction, while dependent on physical reproduction, can only be accomplished by the social system. Thus, any useful notion of an integrated health must consider both physical reproduction and the reproduction of meanings.
Productivity--for societies, individuals, species, structures, and processes, and however defined--represents perhaps, the simplest embodiment of an ability to survive and reproduce. As a result, we have rightly focused on productivity as a key indication of "fitness" for ecosystems as well as our own lives. For what could be more important--more "right"--than an ability to survive? Yet, in many ways, our attempts to understand and enhance this productivity have not appreciated its bio-physical basis. And as one consequence, we have imagined that the entire output of specific ecosystem components could be appropriated for ourselves.
Further, we have often equated physical notions of productivity with simplistic ideological notions of dominance. That is to say, we have confounded real physical competition between individuals or species with human constructed notions of winning and losing in some absolute sense. However, these systems of things, structures, and processes, while competing in a real sense, also cooperate and support each other in ways that change the very definition of productivity. Indeed, it may be that cooperation and commensalism more accurately characterize productive and successful ecosystems. Therefore, one ofthe first tasks of an EE is to understand what ecologists are learning about the nature of productivity--how it is that various fluxes of materials and energy are mobilized and organized by species, communities, and ecosystems in order to adapt and--perhaps--survive?
On the other hand, while our own economic needs cannot be ignored, it may turn out that what we have assumed is ours to do with as we see fit is simply not possible on a sustainable basis. And this is not to imagine anything can be done forever without change. But our demands ought to at least allow Nature's capacity for change to have a chance of keeping pace with our own technical and social change. Therefore, another important task of an EE is to understand what ecologists are learning about the productivity of nature--What functions and processes are performed; what products and services are produced by various ecological hierarchies; how do ecosystems use these "outputs" to maintain themselves; and what possibilities exist for us to intercede in various ecosystem activities while ensuring our joint survival?
Based on the above, the following sections show briefly, and by example, some of the theoretical foundations of an EE as well as summaries of the empirical studies actually being carried out. The following categories are discussed: 1) General economic theory; 2) Physics and thermodynamics; 3) Ecosystems; 4) Ecosystem and economic system interactions; and 5) Policy studies and proposals. But the categories often overlap.
1. General Economic Theory
Most effort in this category concerns the basis for integrating, if possible, Neo-Classical economics and EE. Or if it is not possible, what else might be done? Some of the issues involved are: Metaphysics and world-views, value, scarcity, equity, justice, efficiency, and rationality. As imagined, papers on these topics are often the most difficult as well as the most interesting. In this regard, a paper by Judson (1989) provides an excellent summary of a pivotal debate that most economists have assumed was won long ago by Neo- classical economics--the debate about the nature of value. At present, mainstream or neo-classical economics rests on a subjective theory of value (TOV) that values are purely human in origin and reflect only the subjective tastes and preferences of individuals. Further, social value is nothing more than the sum of individual human values. Yet, if this is so, where is the common ground? If we cannot steer or create ecosystems any way we wish, and are unable to avoid altering ecosystems, how can we judge our actions vis-a- vis ecosystems?
Judson offers a fascinating summary suggesting that there may be a common ground upon which to integrate neo-classical and EE. He shows how so-called neo-Ricardian economic thought can be distinguished from neo-classical economics on the basis of three aspects of value; 1) macro versus micro; 2) objective versus subjective, and 3) dynamic versus static. The first aspect refers to the question whether the "starting point" of economics is "society" (The neo-Ricardian or macro view) or the "individual" (The neo-classical or micro view). The second aspect refers to the question of whether values have an objective basis; whether values "inhere" in resources and things (The neo- Ricardian or objective view) or whether values merely reflect subjective preferences of individuals (The neo-classical or subjective view). What is meant by "inhere" will be discussed below. The third aspect refers to time. Neo-Ricardian analysis embraces an evolutionary, thermodynamic, and largely irreversible worldview, while neo-classical analysis is largely static, reversible, and based on change at the margin. While we know that both perspectives on each of these three points are relevant, and necessary, the initial view chosen makes a great difference when these theories are actually used to organize and operate a real society over the long-run.
Many of these new discussions were fueled by a 1960 paper by Sraffa which showed (for an admittedly simple but still relevant example) that for a macro economy producing commodities which move in a circular flow from one sector to the rest, that the economy will be entirely determinate, save for an inverse relation between the wage rate and the profit rate. He assumed a single price for each commodity type and a uniform rate of profit for this economy as a whole. The point is that the exchange value of every commodity in relation to all others, is set by the sociotechnical conditions of production. And it occurs without any assumptions about tastes and preferences; about the balance of supply and demand; nor about the initial holdings of individuals or firms! That is, the values of commodities reflect their inherent value as components in subsequent economic activity. As a result, this so-called neo-Ricardian view challenges both Marxist and marginalist views.
This notion of inherent values sounds strange--for apparently only humans can assign values to things. But what is being suggested is that the properties of particular kinds of matter and the energy embodied in them are what makes ecosystem functions and human values realizable. Without these inherent features existing first, ecosystem applications or human values are mere value potentials. It is these inherent properties of this matter--such as its energy content or its particular concentrated form which allow other ecosystem processes to use it and thereby persist.
Some critiques of an objective TOV are well-known. First as Georgescu-Roegen (1971) pointed out, matter and energy--despite Einstein--are not practical substitutes within ecosystems. Matter in all its qualitative variety--in particular its crucial macroscopic properties--is also necessary. Second, these various expressions of objective value--whether material or labor or energy focused--cannot be realized without an exchange relation of some sort-- whether between some ecosystem component or in some human economic exchange. That is, for either the basic exchanges of matter or energy considered by physics and characterizing unconscious ecosystem adaptation and evolution, or conscious human exchanges motivated by meanings and economic need, exchange realizes values what were formerly only objective or subjective value- potentials.
The possibilities for integrating these value theories are apparently growing. Judson suggests that one way that objective and subjective values may be compatible is by distinguishing between basic goods and surplus or luxury goods; and between the short- and long-run. Over the long run, the materials and energy embodied in resources and products more accurately reflect inherent or so-called natural values, in the sense that materials with high natural value are somehow more likely to meet the requirements of an ecosystem, thereby enabling it to adapt and survive. But in the short run, and for so-called "surplus" production, trivial or subjective preferences may hold sway as long as the surplus exists. As Judson points out in his end notes, these issues may help accommodate the question of distribution--a topic long neglected by neo-classical economics.
Another important theme in discussions between EE and neo-classical economic theory concerns criticisms that neo-classical economics has not merely misunderstood the bio-physical basis of production but completely ignored it in its preoccupation with admittedly elegant mathematical abstraction and notions of rational choice (Christensen 1989). A number of other criticisms are based on this apparently simple oversight. First regarding inputs, the neo-classical divisions of Land, Labor, and Capital are uselessly heterogenous aggregates. Particular forms of matter, energy, and information flows and various physical structures and agents to mobilize them are required and must be treated in detail. Second, inputs are largely complementary and therefore, the marginal analysis characteristic of neo-classical economics is too abstract. Christensen says that the "Marginal products of individual capital goods simply do not exist." Third, sectors produce inputs that flow to other sectors. Thus, there is complementarity and interdependence between sectors as shown by the coevolution of economic activity. Christensen further points out that "Coevolution occurs when positive feedback initiates an ongoing reciprocal process of change between evolving systems or their components." The emergence of a coal-iron-machine complex in the British industrial revolution is an economic example. Fourth, neo-classical economics is criticized for ignoring crucial distinctions in the timing and other conditions of resource extraction and processing. And fifth, neo-classical economic's technological optimism is based on a crucial oversight. It has ignored the fact that stable or declining resource prices are due primarily to a coincidental (and necessarily short- term) exponential increase in the availability and use of fossil fuels, and not primarily due to our technical prowess--although this is certainly impressive enough.
Other good examples are: Proops (1989), Amir (1989), Maxwell and Randall (1989), Norgaard (1989), Binswanger, Faber, and Manstetten (1990), and Gowdy (1991).
2. Physics and Thermodynamics
This category concerns the physical basis of the phenomena that comprise ecosystems and economic activities. Issues of concern are metaphysics, the laws of thermodynamics, change, and irreversibility. The reference probably most often cited is Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen's 1971 book "The Entropy Law and the Economic Process." In it he points out that while rapid improvements in our ability to mobilize capital, labor, and energy over the last 250 years have allowed us to intensively exploit the earth's natural resources in order to produce ever more material goods for ever larger number of people, it is only recently that we have realized that there was a price over and above what the market required. And this was the unavoidable pollution and waste necessitated by the 2nd law of Thermodynamics. This waste--more properly called entropy--is now seen as often exceeding the capacity of the environment to absorb it, disturbing and disordering Nature so that it is less useful to ourselves and perhaps itself as well.
The failure to consider the scale of our economic activity and the resulting entropy created is now manifest in a variety of ways more than ever before. Global climate change--either through the indirect effect of carbon dioxide emissions, or the direct effects of waste heat associated with cities or other large industrial complexes--is widely feared.
Having said this however, there is also widespread disagreement concerning what the 2nd Law means in practice. O'Connor (1991) shows that difficulties interpreting the 2nd law exist even within Physics itself, but are especially problematic when attempts are made to apply it to social systems of which economic activity is a part. And in addition to questions of precisely "how" thermodynamics limits ecosystems, economic activities, and eventually social systems, there are even those who hold that Georgescu-Roegen's concerns are unwarranted in the face of human purpose (Khalil 1990, 1991, and Lozada 1991).
At a more practical level, Kummel (1989) used thermodynamic theory and data on energy use in The Netherlands, Japan, and West Germany in order to estimate the potential energy savings if a program of conservation were carried out. For the 2nd law allows one to calculate the efficiency attainable--the smaller the difference in temperature between a heat source and the sink in which it is disposed after use; the lower the limit on energy efficiency. Indeed, it is the potential temperature difference and the attainable efficiency that defines a "high quality" energy source. Given current energy uses, savings of 40 to 60 percent were in theory obtainable. But the savings varied widely. Curiously, West Germany's savings would not be as great, despite the high quality of its waste heat, because it was not near enough to those who might want it.
3. Ecosystems
Issues within this category concern ecosystem accounting; material and energy balances; resource stocks and flows; biodiversity; ecosystem capacity; ecosystem services; and sustainability. As with the work of Georgescu-Roegen earlier, the work of Howard Odum in systems ecology stands out (1983). An excellent example of work which makes explicit the parallels between an economy and an ecosystem is provided by Hannon (1991). He describes an accounting framework connecting individual species, collections of species, and their abiotic environment through the physically quantifiable exchanges between ecological processes (i.e. insect or plant) and the various products or services of these processes (i.e. flower nectar mass, bee pollination in seconds per unit mass). Originally guided by the efforts of economic input- output modellers, these ecosystem accounting models now also consider thermodynamic constraints. In these systems, physical materials, services, or information can be unambiguously assigned, quantified, and balances checked. What is more, data from widely disparate sources, even different eras can be integrated to extend their original uses and objectives. Avoiding the duplication of effort is an especially significant advantage.
Applications of such models include; 1) Network analyses and energy intensities: A mix of inputs and outputs is a significant problem in economics and ecology. Research is examining the possibility of converting multi-product accounts to a more convenient single-product account. Energy intensities (analogous to prices) might allow all of a systems output to be converted to a common "currency" for further analysis of various networks; 2) Geographical and economic connections: Interconnected ecosystem linkages may be able to be constructed by juxtaposing the accounting matrices of each in order to assemble a joint matrix for analysis. This could perhaps be done by appending an economic matrix to the biophysical matrix of its associated ecosystem. Various interchanges such as pollution or environmental services to the economy could be tracked. As a result, the economic "value" of the ecosystem could be estimated; 3) Model building and data enhancement: No model can ever be complete or entirely coherent and more detail is always desired. But even partial answers are needed now. Ecosystem accounting frameworks would be a sound basis for these models, both for constructing coefficients as well as verification; and 4) Research coordination: As research proposals are developed and reviewed, their comparison with the existing accounting system gaps would help assure that efforts do not ignore current needs more than necessary. This review would also avoid reinventing work already completed.
Other examples are: Odum (1983), Hall, Cleveland, and Kaufmann (1986), Costanza, Faber, Maxwell (1989),
4. Ecosystem-economic system interaction
This category and the next are probably of greatest interest to forest economists because they are the areas most familiar. Topics of interest include: structure and scale of regional or national economies (Input-Output Analysis); employment, income, and their distribution; distinctions between income and wealth; natural and man-made capital; capital depreciation; internal and international trade; pollution; investment; social accounts; demographics, etc.
Two examples are probably required here. The first concerns macro-economic attempts to improve the system of national or regional accounts connecting the flows of products, wages, and income in the economy with the stocks supporting those flows, both in the human economy and as natural resources in general. These stocks include traditional items such as forests and minerals as well as the potential for natural services. The primary concern is the structure and scale of economic activity and its dependence and impact on Nature. The aggregate production of income and wealth--in both the natural world and in the human economy--is the focus. Repetto et al (1989) is preeminent in this area. His "Wasting Assets" describes the recent yet tremendous importance of national accounts in providing an almost universal standard of what economic development ought to be. Yet he points out the serious problems with the accounts as now implemented and more important, that these shortcomings are largely ignored.
For while the concerns which originally motivated their development--major fluctuations in the business cycle--are still the central concern of most governments, questions concerning the sustainability of the natural world have assumed major importance. There is he says "...a dangerous asymetry in the way we measure, and hence, the way we think about, the value of natural resources." While we recognize that if a level of income is only maintained by drawing down the stock of capital on which it is based, one would soon have no income. But natural resources--so-called natural capital--are not considered in the same fashion. The roots of this oversight are many. And despite the widespread recognition of this asymetry, although there is movement, very little is being done at the policy level.
In "Wasting Assets" a more accurate but still inadequate measure of Indonesia's Net Domestic Product for the period 1971 to 1984 shows that instead of achieving an apparent annual growth of about 7 percent as the Gross Domestic Product suggests, it rose only 4 percent annually. And these adjustments only consider a few of the commodities produced--a full accounting would certainly show a larger gap. Moreover, other indicators are similarly biased. Gross versus Net Investment showed that for a number of years Net Investment was actually negative. This implies that instead of growing, consumption merely used up the principal. Some of the years that net investment grew were due to the fortunate but unrepeatable discovery of exhaustible petroleum reserves.
"Wasting Assets" combines both an examination of the problems of an inadequate system of accounts, as well as a discussion of the policies by which one could correct the situation. It follows with an empirical evaluation of Indonesian resource accounts for timber, petroleum, and soil. Repetto et al conclude that 1) developing these accounts can be accomplished with modest time and money, 2) A significantly different view of Indonesia's economic past, and as a result its future, was obtained, and most important to us as forestry professionals, 3) Such efforts are consistent with, and complementary to our efforts to implement more responsible and more scientifically sound forest practices.
A second example in this category concerns a more detailed look at the specific ecological and economic interactions within the Baltic Sea and its surrounding agricultural, fishery, and industrial activities. Folke, Hammer, and Jansson (1991) emphasize the interdependence of past urban/industrial/agricultural development on environmental goods and services, as well as on ecosystem support functions. They relate the increase in industrial production and related environmental problems in the region to several factors, especially fossil fuel usage. In 1900 annual energy consumption in Baltic Europe was 9 tons per square km and 0.25 tons per person. By 1984 this had increased to 284 tons and 5 tons respectively. Industrial production has increased--depending on the country considered--by 5 to 15 times since World War II, and population has increased 4 times since the mid-1900's.
The cumulative effects of this activity on the Baltic Sea's food-web, in conjunction with an intense increase in fishing pressure, has severely reduced the productivity of the entire system. While the catch has increased 10-fold in the last 50 years, the catch per unit effort (kg of fish per horsepower per hour) declined to less than half of what it was in 1955. A striking calculation shows that whereas in 1900 less than 2 percent of the surface of the Baltic was required to produce the 1900 catch, about 85 percent of its area is now required. And also based on these fish declines and other toxicity problems, grey seal numbers have declined from about 40,000 in 1940 to about 1500 now.
Other examples are: Costanza, Farber, Maxwell (1989), Faber, Proops, Ruth, and Michaelis (1990), Hof, Rideout and Binkley (1990), Stigliani (1990), van den Bergh and Nijkamp (1991), Giampietro and Pimentel (1991), Braat and Steetskamp (1991), and Cleveland (1991).
5. POLICY STUDIES AND PROPOSALS
The use and acceptance of a discipline for policy analyses is probably a good sign of its maturity--either that or policy makers are desperate. The examples listed here probably support either theory. Ecological and economic interactions increasingly occupy national and international discussions. Some of the topics involved are business regulation; pollution abatement; income and cost distributions of various environmental damages; public health issues such as the ozone-skin cancer relation; population growth; and all manner of global issues such as climate change and deforestation.
Costanza and Perrings (1990) provide an example of how to combine what we now know about the uncertainties of environmental protection with what we also know about the difficulties of more direct forms of social control such as regulation or outright prohibition. In order to develop more cost effective, less intrusive, and generally more positive stimuli to protect and/or manage environmental use, they evaluated a flexible assurance bonding system. This bond would be required by developers and would be set equal to the largest estimated potential environmental damage that might occur from the proposed action. The bond would be kept in an interest bearing account and would be returned to the developer with some of the interest as soon as the firm proved that the damage would or could not occur. If the catastrophe did occur, the bond would be used to compensate those harmed or help repair the damage. But no further payment would be required from the developer.
Their proposal had several advantages: 1) The firm would know at the outset what the bond would cost and could plan accordingly. Down-side risk would be known and limited. But if the developer was diligent, careful, or lucky, all of the bond might be returned with some interest; 2) There would be positive incentives to adopt the most efficient known techniques or even develop new methods; 3) The bond would be proportional to the seriousness of the problem; 4) Costs would be shared among the responsible parties; and 5) Private and social costs would be in accord. But two provisos are suggested: a) Monitoring systems should be provided with the most up-to-date information to minimize surprise and b) monitoring costs and the burden of proof should be born by those who stand to profit, not the general public.
Many other policy studies exist--from proposals to swap Third-world debt for agreements not to undertake development in certain environmentally sensitive regions (Perrings 1989); to how best to get farmers to use less fertilizer, thereby improving water potability (Andreasson 1990); to whether even admittedly crude estimates of ecosystem carrying capacity can help avoid serious policy errors in developing the Ecuadoran Amazon or the Paraguayan Chaco (Daly 1990).
Ecological Economics is concerned with clarifying the crucial linkages between human economic activities and ecosystem functions and processes and these brief examples only hint at its sweep. And in light of growing awareness about the disturbances to, sometimes even the destruction of, ecosystem capabilities which necessarily accompany our economic striving, it is more important than ever that we more clearly understand these linkages. Such clarifications might one day allow us to identify the thresholds of acceptable ecosystem disturbance. Or since this is probably expecting too much, these might suggest new or modified strategies and institutions that could more likely see us through the inevitable ambiguities involving not only real physical resource limits, but also the largely irreplaceable, often intangible structures and processes of ecosystems.
But while our economic actions are often unavoidable, we also know that the qualitative as well as quantitative consequences of our actions vary widely across a spectrum of social and ecosystem interactions. From an examination of other cultures--past and present--it seems that some life-styles and their expectations from, as well as impacts on ecosystems may be less likely to damage ecosystems than others. And if we can identify more benign social and technical arrangements, we may have more room to maneuver. For our purpose, these activities can be seen as occurring within three nested spheres: 1) the all-encompassing ecosystem; 2) the social system within the ecosystem; and 3) the interconnecting economic activities. This framework offers a way to relate recent studies which considered these interactions. Some embrace the notions of EE more than others, but all share the view that something important is happening. And most agree that any success will result from a synthesis of many different disciplines and approaches. In a small way, while describing what Ecological Economics actually does, they point in the broadest sense to what it may yet accomplish.
LITERATURE CITED
Andreasson, I-M. (1990). Costs for reducing farmers' use of nitrogen in Gotland, Sweden. Ecological Economics 2(4):287-299.
Amir, S. 1989. On the use of ecological prices and system-wide indicators derived therefrom to quantify Man's impact on the ecosystem. Ecological Economics. 1(3):203-232.
Barbier, E.B. 1990. Alternative approaches to economic-environmental interactions. Ecological Economics. 2(1):7-26.
Bergh, J.C.J.M. van den and Nijkamp, P. 1991. Operationalizing sustainable development: Dynamic ecological economic models. Ecological Economics.4(1):11-34.
Binswanger, H., Faber, M. and Manstetten, R. 1990. The dilemma of modern man and nature: An exploration of the Faustian imperative. Ecological Economics. 2(3):197-223.
Braat, L.C. and Steetskamp, I. 1991. Ecological economic analysis for regional sustainable development. In: Ecological Economics: The science and management of sustainability. Costanza, R. (ed.) p. 269-288. Columbia Univ. Press. New York. 526 p
Christensen, P.P. 1989. Historical roots for ecological economics: Biophysical versus allocative approached. Ecological Economics. 1(1):17-36.
Cleveland, C.J. 1991. Natural resource scarcity and economic growth revisited: Economic and biophysical perspectives. In: Ecological Economics: The science and management of sustainability. Costanza, R. (ed.) p. 289-317. Columbia Univ. Press. New York. 526 p
Costanza, R., Farber, S.C., and Maxwell, J. (1989). Valuation and management of wetland ecosystems. Ecological Economics. 1(4):335-361.
Costanza, R. and Perrings, C. 1990. A flexible assurance bonding system for improved environmental management. Ecological Economics. 2(1):57-75.
Daly, H.E. (1990. Carrying capacity as a tool of development policy: the Ecuadoran Amazon and the Paraguayan Chaco. Ecological Economics. 2(3):187-195.
Faber, M., Proops, J., Ruth, M. and Michaelis, P. 1990. Economy environment interactions in the long-run: A neo-austrian approach. Ecological Economics. 2(1):27-56
Folke, C., Hammer, M. and Jansson, A-M. 1991. Life support value of ecosystems: A case study of the Baltic Sea region. Ecological Economics. 3(2):123-137.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. 1971. The entropy law and the economic process. Harvard Univ. Press. Cambridge, MA. 457p.
Giampietro, M. and Pimentel, D. 1991. Energy efficiency: Assessing the interaction between humans and their environment. Ecological Economics.4(2):117-144.
Gowdy, J.M. 1991. Bioeconomics and post Keynesian economics: A search for common ground. Ecological Economics. 3(1):77-88.
Hall, C., Cleveland, C. and Kaufmann, R. 1986. Energy and resource quality: The ecology of the economic process. John Wiley and Sons. New York. 577p.
Hannon, B. 1991. Accounting in ecological systems. In: Ecological Economics: The science and management of sustainability. Costanza, R. (ed.) p. 234-252. Columbia Univ. Press. New York. 526 p.
Hof, J.; Rideout, D. and Binkley, D. 1990. Carbon fixation in trees as a micro optimization process: An example of combining ecology and economics. Ecological Economics. 2(3):243-256.
Judson, D.H. 1989. The convergence of neo-ricardian and embodied energy theories of value and price. Ecological Economics. 1(3):261-282.
Khalil, E.L. 1990. Entropy law and exhaustion of natural resources: Is Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen's paradigm defensible? Ecological Economics. 2(2):163-178.
Khalil, E.L. 1991. Entropy law and Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen's paradigm: A reply. Ecological Economics. 3(2):161-163.
Kummel, R. 1989. Energy as a factor of production and entropy as a pollution indicator in macroeconomic modelling. Ecological Economics. 1(2):161-180.
Lewis, Bernard J. 1991. Action, society and nature: Communicative ethics and the practice of ecological economics. In proceedings: Ecological Economics: Its implications for forest management and research. Bradley, D. and Nilsson P. (Eds.) Swedish Univ. of Agric. Sciences. Garpenberg. 231 p.
Maxwell, J. and Randall, A. 1989. Ecological economic modelling in a pluralistic, participatory society. Ecological Economics. 1(2):233-251.
Lozada, G.A. 1991. A defense of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen's paradigm. Ecological Economics. 3(2):157-160.
Norgaard, R.B. 1989. Three dilemmas of environmental accounting. Ecological Economics. 1(4):303-314.
O'Connor, M. 1991. Entropy, structure, and organizational change. Ecological Economics. 3(2):95-122.
Odum, H. 1983. Systems ecology: An introduction. John Wiley and Sons. New York. 644p.
Perrings, C. (1989). Environmental bonds and environmental research in innovative activities. Ecological Economics. 1(1):95-110.
Proops, J.R.L. 1989. Ecological economics: Rationales and problem areas. Ecological Economics. 1(1):59-76.
Repetto, R., Magrath, W., Wells, M., Beer, C. and Rossini, F. 1989. Wasting Assets: Natural resources in the national income accounts. World Resources Institute. New York. 69 pages.
Sraffa, P. 1960. Production of commodities by means of commodities. Cambridge Univ. Press. 98p.
Stigliani, W.M. (1990. Chemical emissions from the processing and use of materials: the need for an integrated emissions accounting system. Ecological Economics. 2(4):325-341.